The closing of the progressive mind

Identity politics cannot resolve religious and cultural tensions

Towering columns

For The Spectator, Yascha Mounk explains how identity politics has distorted the progressive left’s understanding of racism and provided cover for antisemitism.

The claim that Israel is a European power engaged in ‘settler colonialism’ has become a ubiquitous part of the rhetoric against the Jewish state. But like the claim that the conflict pits whites against people of colour, it fundamentally warps the issue at hand. In fact, the idea that Israel is a settler colony in the way that America once was is doubly distorting.

For one thing, Jews trace their origins back to Israel. They have been present in the region for thousands of years. Far from being analogous to the English who set sail for a supposedly virgin continent, they – like the Palestinians – have a strong claim to being indigenous inhabitants of the area.

For another, the description of Israel as a ‘European’ project fails to grapple with the country’s present-day demographic composition. After all, millions of Israeli Jews are Mizrahi rather than Ashkenazi. They are descendants of people who have, over the course of the last three quarters of a century, been violently expelled from Middle Eastern countries, had nowhere else to turn, and would today be neither safe nor welcome if they sought to return. There is also the fact that 21 per cent of Israel’s population are Arabs – many of whom were also murdered by Hamas on 7 October.

There is a bitter irony to all of this. The progressive left claims to be fighting colonialism. And yet it is so uninterested in the reality of non-western countries that it winds up blindly imposing conceptual categories that were forged in the context of American history and society on the rest of the world. The identity synthesis may be dressed up in postcolonial clothes; but it is itself a neo-colonial enterprise.

At The Free Press, Konstantin Kisin looks at how the response from progressives to the October 7 attack has caused many on the left to reconsider their worldview.

A friend of mine joked that she woke up on October 7 as a liberal and went to bed that evening as a 65-year-old conservative. But it wasn’t really a joke and she wasn’t the only one. What changed? The best way to answer that question is with the help of Thomas Sowell, one of the most brilliant public intellectuals alive today. In 1987, Sowell published A Conflict of Visions. In this now-classic, he offers a simple and powerful explanation of why people disagree about politics. We disagree about politics, Sowell argues, because we disagree about human nature. We see the world through one of two competing visions, each of which tells a radically different story about human nature.

Those with “unconstrained vision” think that humans are malleable and can be perfected. They believe that social ills and evils can be overcome through collective action that encourages humans to behave better. To subscribers of this view, poverty, crime, inequality, and war are not inevitable. Rather, they are puzzles that can be solved. We need only to say the right things, enact the right policies, and spend enough money, and we will suffer these social ills no more. This worldview is the foundation of the progressive mindset.

By contrast, those who see the world through a “constrained vision” lens believe that human nature is a universal constant. No amount of social engineering can change the sober reality of human self-interest, or the fact that human empathy and social resources are necessarily scarce. People who see things this way believe that most political and social problems will never be “solved”; they can only be managed. This approach is the bedrock of the conservative worldview.

Hamas’s barbarism—and the explanations and celebrations throughout the West that followed their orgy of violence—have forced an overnight exodus from the “unconstrained” camp into the “constrained” one. 

At ConservativeHome, James Johnson compares the American public’s more robust reaction to the Israel-Hamas war with the UK’s fractured approach.

I ran two focus groups in the days after the attack: one with English swing voters, and one with Democrats in Atlanta, Georgia. The latter were clear-eyed: appalled by the savagery of the attacks, supportive for Israel to take defensive action, nervous about civilian lives in Gaza…

…How have Americans – by and large rancorous and divided – put their differences aside on this issue? One major element underpinning it is a deep-rooted cultural affinity with Israel. A southern Baptist in my Atlanta focus group said she prayed for Israel as she prays for God. But with some Republican voters even rallying to Joe Biden, there is a broader steeliness that comes on show during times of foreign strife.

In Colin Woodward’s American Nations he identifies the ‘Appalachians’ amongst his eleven different American nations. Inhabiting Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia and Texas, these descendants of Scots-Irish immigrants are stereotyped as the hillbillies and the rednecks. Many of them rushed to Trump in 2016. But these same voters have, in every single war America has fought, been the most eager to serve in the military, even when its commander-in-chief has been a president they despise.

Drive around America for five minutes and you will be struck by the number of US flags. The Appalachians and most of the rest of the nation still have a strong sense of national pride. Our Atlantic partners might be a bit mad, but they still care – about their country, about its future. Polarisation has its many negative effects, but one of its positives is its ability to galvanise that passion.

In The Times, Juliet Samuel exposes the legal battles raging over human rights in continental Europe’s struggle to control the flow of illegal migration.

Overall, according to the Civil Liberties Union for Europe, France ignores nearly a fifth of adverse ECHR rulings, versus just under a tenth ignored by the UK — though the ECHR disagrees and says 97-98 per cent of cases are closed and the rest are being implemented. Yet for some reason, the liberal outcry against Paris is muted. Dominic Grieve has not yet chained himself to the railings of the Élysée. No credible legal scholar has labelled President Macron a “fascist”.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, many European capitals would quietly love to see the UK win its upcoming ECHR case on the legality of the Rwanda scheme, which will be heard at some point after the UK Supreme Court ruling expected next month. That is because they nearly all regard the court’s approach to deportation as a menace to a sound migration policy. With illegal migration booming across the continent, politicians are desperate for tools to manage the situation. They are hoping the Rwanda scheme will establish a useful precedent for other governments. No doubt, to certain anti-government partisans in London, this sounds incredible. But if it does, it simply means they have not been following the conduct of Brussels and its member states on migration.

In theory, of course, Brussels is a great supporter of the whole legal architecture of modern “human rights”. In 2009, EU states grandly proclaimed that as a sign of their commitment to such values, the bloc would forthwith be subjecting itself to ECHR authority. A few years down the line, however, the EU’s own top court, the European Court of Justice, in effect vetoed its accession. EU law, it said, ought to be decided by EU institutions — and anyway, those institutions already had their own robust protections for human rights, so submitting them to a higher court was not desirable. This means that Brussels remains the only political authority in Europe currently exempt from the ECHR.

At UnHerd, Philip Pilkington surveys an economic landscape that is not coping with interest rate rises and could lead towards another Great Recession.

The British economy is particularly prone to higher interest rates, most glaringly through its overinflated and economically axial housing market. At its previous peak in 2007, before housing crashed worldwide, the average house in England was worth around 7.15x the average salary. Fifteen years later, this has risen to 8.28x — a record high. And though our housing debate is dominated by questions of supply — the intractable Yimby v Nimby contestation — there is every reason to think that the current inflation in house prices is another speculative mania of the sort we saw collapse in 2008.

It is already telling that the housing market has proven completely unable to stomach higher interest rates. House prices have been falling every month since January of this year and in the third quarter of 2023 the average house price was down nearly 5% from its peak. While this may not seem like much, declines in house prices of this nature this rarely bottom out quickly and usually signal further falls. The pressure in this regard can be seen in the falling number of mortgage approvals in Britain, a contraction which dates back to 2020. Mortgage approvals went into steep decline after August 2022 as the Bank of England interest rate rose to just under 2%; it was shortly after this that house prices themselves began to decline.

And this is leading to a consequent decline in construction as firms pull out of new projects, no longer confident of a return on their investments. Private housing construction output in August was down 7.1% since the start of the year, and 15.9% from its peak in May 2022. The labour market is already beginning to mirror this trend. Between July and September, vacancies in the real estate sector fell 29.6% from the previous quarter. It is very likely that — for the second time this century — the Great British housing bubble has burst. And, just as in 2008, it is taking the rest of the economy with it. A deep recession is now very probable.

In The Times, Iain Martin believes we should listen carefully to what the bond markets have to say about geopolitical risk and the future of public spending.

The moves in the bond markets indicate that investors have decided the pandemic party of ever-increasing spending is now over. Unfortunately, no one has yet had the heart or the courage before an election year to tell voters, who probably don’t want to hear it anyway.

Even this week, with the bond market problem and a potential shutdown of the US government still a possibility if Congress cannot agree a deal next month, the White House is pushing ahead with requests and orders for yet more spending on all manner of stuff, despite what investors are saying.

What’s worrying is that the US and much of the West is maxed out on spending and debt even before a potential clash with the autocracies who seem determined to take on, oppress or defeat the democracies. At the end of the Second World War, after civilisation had been saved, the US debt-to-GDP ratio (how much the government owes on behalf of its citizens measured alongside the size of the economy) was 114 per cent. Today, it is approaching 130 per cent, and we are only in the early stages of the fight.

In this context it is worrying that there is so little understanding of how perilous the geopolitical and economic situation is, or the scale of the sacrifice and economic reorganisation that is going to be required by the democracies if what’s happening now turns into a regional war or something even worse. To deter the West’s enemies successfully and to prevent further conflict will require more of our nations’ spending to go on security.

Wonky thinking

The Startup Coalition, Tony Blair Institute for Change, and Onward have published their joint report The UK’s AI Startup Roadmap. Ahead of the AI Summit in London this November, they have outlined ideas to help narrow the gap between what is happening in the private sector and in politics.

Four key challenges emerged from our discussions. First, access to capital. While the UK is far up the rankings in global tech investment, European nations are making significant gains. Paris-based Mistral’s recent $113 million initial funding round was the largest ever seed round in Europe. Raising funds remains AI founders’ top concern. Untapped potential funding from the pension market would be a vital means of increasing the capital pools, underlining the importance of reforming pension funds as committed to in the Mansion House Reforms. Cuts to R&D tax credits in 2022 have also hurt startups – and the system should be reformed so that startups do not lose out while more effectively promoting innovation, especially Deeptech. And while our Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) have historically been incredibly successful incentives, they need to keep pace with the times.

Second, access to talent. AI startups struggle to compete with the US for top tech talent due to issues like salary levels and visa challenges. Some founders argued that the pull factors that used to make the UK an enticing place to home their startups have lessened due to broader economic issues. Startups also told us that they fear an overfocus on AI safety by the Government could, in the long run, hinder our ability to attract founders, innovators, and engineers who drive innovation and experimentation. We heard repeatedly that the visa system is not supporting the tech sector as effectively as it could be. The High Potential Individual Visa is too narrow – meaning many future founders are unlikely to qualify under the scheme upon graduation. The Youth Mobility Scheme is another key route, but does not include the US. And the Global Talent Visa and Innovator Founder Visa schemes are both held back due to lack of clarity over the endorsement systems underpinning them.

Third, access to compute. Overwhelmingly, startups wanted one thing more than anything else when it came to compute: access to cost-effective and readily available compute capacity. But our compute offer isn’t competitive. By the government’s own research: the UK went from third in global compute capacity in 2005, to 10th by 2022. Initiatives like the national AI Research Resource in Bristol are welcome but will struggle to keep pace. Startups also want access to private compute options, and many of the UK’s AI startups have opted to build off existing AI infrastructure, such as via APIs or cloud infrastructure. But startups can struggle to get formalised relationships with compute providers quickly and at a reasonable price.

Fourth, regulatory compliance. Despite welcoming the sector-specific approach to AI regulation set in the Government’s AI White Paper earlier this year, founders fear that the increased focus on AI safety concerns could create an impetus for over-regulation that would stifle the sector. They also fear that the tradeoff between explainability and accuracy of models may not be appreciated – an overly burdensome focus on explainability could cause models to be “dumbed down” and curb companies’ innovative edge. Uncertainty too is a key concern. Regulatory sandboxes are seen as a potentially key enabler of innovation and can boost regulator-industry cooperation, but only if done correctly. Yet the AI White Paper’s 12-month timeline is already regarded as too slow and there are concerns that even this goal is likely to be missed as the Government has not kept to the timetable it set itself.

The overarching lesson is that as the Government develops its approach to AI we have to keep the tried-and-tested basics in mind. Across capital, talent, compute, and compliance, we have yet to really nail the fundamentals: accessing capital throughout the lifecycle, hiring and bringing the best and brightest talent possible, competing on compute and data infrastructure internationally, and navigating the regulatory environment. There is much more to do.

A project led by former Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls and sponsored by the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London, and the Gatsby Foundation have published their latest working paper Why Hasn’t UK Regional Policy Worked? It is based on a series of interviews with leading British policy practitioners including Sir Tony Blair, Sir John Major, Andy Haldane, Lord Heseltine, Andy Burnham, Andy Street, Lord Pickles, and Michael Gove.

There are four contentious issues any future consensus will need to address where there is no current consensus among our interviewees. These are:

a) What are the most important policy levers for growth in the English regions, and what is the right level for decision-making? Many interviewees stress the importance of central government’s role in an era of ‘modern industrial policy’ to raise productivity growth and tackle climate change; but most argued that we have relied too heavily on central delivery to meet national productivity and industrial goals. (A substantial minority continue to praise regionally-based but nationally-accountable bodies like Regional Development Agencies). Some argue that transport and planning decision-making should be aligned at the sub-regional level, but others stress political obstacles to such a change. Many regret the bias in public innovation support to the wider South East, while some advocate investing in success. But in some policy areas, there is a clearer consensus that the time is ripe for decentralisation – most clearly in skills.

b) Where decentralisation is part of the answer, what model should we adopt? Our interviewees generally believe that the Greater Manchester-originated Mayoral Combined Authority model is working to build political coalitions in urban areas (even where that may have been difficult before, as in the West Midlands or West Yorkshire). Some contrast Greater Manchester with the London Mayoralty, stressing difference in powers and collaboration with other public authorities. However, there is a concern among some that this model may not work in less urban areas, or that it may lead to a side-lining of towns and rural areas within city-regions. Some believe the Mayoral Combined Authority model has demonstrated its ability to work everywhere; but others note that we are de facto moving away from a single approach in any case, as MCAs sit alongside a growing diversity of county-based bodies in England (as well as the London Mayoralty; Devolved Governments, Parliaments and Assemblies). Others still make the case for “pan-regional” bodies for larger projects, such as inter-regional transport.

c) How much should Whitehall drive institutional reform in England to make any map of government comprehensive? Most of our interviewees were concerned about the places currently excluded from any intermediate (sub-regional or Combined Authority) tier of government; but they were split on how “top-down” the process of devolution should be. Should we follow the current voluntary, step-by-step approach, or is now time to rollout/mandate a “proven” solution for communities currently “left out” of the mayoralties? Most think that it is increasingly urgent for Government to mandate a solution from the centre to prevent widening inequalities, though the shape of that solution remains disputed.

d) How do we fund a more decentralised government – balancing equity with incentives? Most interviewees were sceptical that fiscal devolution could or should play a bigger role in regional policy in the near term. They prefer UK-level redistribution (such as through a return to more generous local and regional government financial settlements), due to either: our starting point of high inequalities and high variation in tax bases; the impact of a decade of austerity on local capacity; or due to the economic geography of our country, where short distances between urban areas mean regional economies are not as selfcontained as in other countries. A few interviewees did advocate bolder fiscal devolution – generally building on the Scottish example, with increased local tax retention, ‘single settlement’ flexibilities, and funding stability through a “Barnett formula for the nations and regions”. Of those, there is a split between those who think we ought to prioritise fiscal devolution in the next parliament, and those who see it as a longer-term goal.

In short, our interviewees offer up a coherent diagnosis of the UK’s regional growth policy problem: a failure to develop an ambitious, holistic, long-term and cross-party response. But they go further, talking of their personal regret at not doing enough to help build that consensus – or indeed ignoring the issue altogether. Their prognosis is that, in the face of genuine on-going pressures to centralise, only ambitious and visionary political leadership can break that cycle.

Book of the week

We recommend reading The House of Islam: A Global History by Ed Husain. The author provides a history of the teachings, culture, and influence of Islam, making the case for greater understanding between the West and the Muslim world.

The House of Islam is on fire - and the arsonist still lives there. Neighbours can bring water to put out the fire, but Muslims must also expel the fire bombers in their midst. It is no longer enough simply to condemn terrorism. Muslims deserve no applause or special recognition merely for condemning murderers. That is the least we can do, not the most. The measure of civilisation is not that low. From the earliest days of Islam, the Kharijites were so called because they were exactly that: outsiders, people who had 'gone out', beyond the pale. The greatest of Muslim scholars declared them to be non-Muslims. And the earliest violent Salafi-jihadis were banned from Mecca by the gad and the Ottoman rulers because they were considered to be infidels.

As long as the House of Islam provides shelter for Salafi-jihadis, the rest of the world will attack Islam and Muslims. A poll carried out in the Netherlands in 2013 disclosed that 73 per cent of respondents said that 'a relationship exists between Islam and terror attacks. In France in the same year, 74 per cent of people polled said that they considered Islam as intolerant, and 73 per cent viewed Islam negatively. In Germany in 2012, 64 per cent of Germans associated Islam with violence and 70 per cent connected Islam with fanaticism and radicalism.

As long as Muslims tolerate their presence, we will give licence even to the ideologues in both the East and West to conflate Islam with Salafi-jihadism. More Muslims will turn to jihadism, and another generation will be lost. We need to cleanse our mosques, publishing houses, schools, websites, satellite TV stations, madrasas and ministries of Salafi-jihadi influences. Unless we do, Islamophobia will continue to rise and we cannot complain when the West repeatedly suggests that Muslims are suspect. Unless we do, no matter how much Muslims protest, they will continue to share the opprobrium heaped on those who claim to represent us. Unless we do, we cannot credibly claim that 'they have nothing to do with us'. Sadly, they do come from within us…

…As matters stand, Islam and ordinary Muslims are not responsible for terrorism, but have something to do with Salafi violence. Just as Pakistan was held in deep distrust for harbouring Osama bin Laden, the role of its madrasas and for assisting North Korea with nuclear technology, today the Islamic world is considered suspect for including murderers, beheaders, rapists, slave owners and terrorists. There needs to be a global declaration by all fifty-plus Muslim governments and their Islamic leaders, disowning these theological brigands as disbelievers. This should start with a summit in Mecca and then amplified in multiple Muslim capitals over a sustained period of time...

…The House of Islam is on fire. Anger and hate are fanning the flames from room to room. We must act before it suffocates us. We all need to bring buckets of water to douse the flames, and then support the task of renovating after the fire we helped to set. Unlike climate change or natural disasters, we can make a real difference in our lifetimes, and create peaceable alliances in the Muslim world. And to do that, we must turn our urgent attention to the battle of ideas raging across the Middle East.

Quick links

The UK Government has published a major paper on the capabilities and risks of frontier AI.

Facebook co-founder Dustin Moskovitz claimed that it is “better that the UK is out of the EU” to take the lead in the AI market.

Only 13% of people have confidence in current and future UK governments to effectively regulate the development and use of AI.

Prime Minister Rishi Sunak marked his first year in office, outlining the achievements of his government over the past 52 weeks.

Polling showed that 74% of British adults agree that foreign nationals who glorify Islamist terrorism should be expelled from the country. Only 4% disagree…

…and 29% of people believe the police have been too cautious in their handling of pro-Palestine protests and should make more arrests.

ONS labour market data has been changed to reflect tax and benefit data instead of the Labour Force Survey ahead of interest rate decision.

Self employment has continued to decline following its collapse during the pandemic.

Equality and Human Rights Commission Chair Baroness Falkner has been cleared of allegations related to her views on trans rights.

Civil servants have been resisting instructions from ministers to display Israeli flags in Whitehall.

China commemorated ten years of its $1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative with a two-day forum in Beijing.

A significant increase in calls to the modern slavery helpline has been reported.

Former Levelling Up Secretary Simon Clarke warned that NIMBYism cannot win back voters in Middle England.

Chancellor Jeremy Hunt is considering a package of support for first-time buyers in the forthcoming autumn statement.

The BBC has been teaching “white privilege” as fact to children through CBBC.

Shadow Chancellor Rachel Reeves plagiarised Wikipedia and Hilary Benn in her new book about female economists whose work have not been sufficiently recognised.